Albertson v. School Board of Fenway: Is Racial Imbalance in Public Schools Unconstitutional--Yes by Greenberg, Stanley I.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 31 
Issue 3 Summer 1966 Article 4 
Summer 1966 
Albertson v. School Board of Fenway: Is Racial Imbalance in 
Public Schools Unconstitutional--Yes 
Stanley I. Greenberg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stanley I. Greenberg, Albertson v. School Board of Fenway: Is Racial Imbalance in Public Schools 
Unconstitutional--Yes, 31 MO. L. REV. (1966) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss3/4 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
Comments
ALBERTSON V. SCHOOL BOARD OF FENWAY: IS RACIAL IMBALANCE
IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS UNCONSTITUTIONAL?-YES*
INTRODUCTION
In the years since Brown v. Board of Education most school districts in this
country have abandoned the traditional segregated school system. Today what is
called "de facto" segregation or "racial imbalance" is the prevailing situation
in most areas with large Negro populations. This results from a variety of factors,
primarily housing patterns and the use of the neighborhood school plan.
The basic issue is not whether racially imbalanced public schools are uncon-
stitutional in every case. Obviously, a large area that has no white students cannot
be integrated, and vice-versa, unless the Fourteenth Amendment imposes a duty
upon states to look beyond city and county (and perhaps even sister state)
boundaries. It is unlikely that any court would go this far. Nor is the issue whether
the state operates a school system that is essentially segregated even though it
is not required by positive law. Rather, the problem turns on the equal educational
opportunity principle: Has the state provided, within the framework of permissi-
ble educational policies, for the fullest possible use of its educational facilities
so as to provide as equal an educational opportunity to the greatest number of
students, as possible, within its jurisdiction?
STATE ENT OF FACTS
The City of Fenway in the State of Jefferson has a population of 15,700.
Slightly over 11,000 of these are white, and approximately 4,500 are Negro. The
City has five grade schools and a single high school. Grades one through eight are
taught at each of the grade schools and the single high school covers grades nine
through twelve.
The city is divided into five grade school districts of almost equal area. Almost
all of the Negroes in Fenway live close to the center of the city. The area of
School District 5 is about the same as the Negro residential area in the center
of the city. Consequently, 95 per cent of all Negro children of grade school age
attend Washington School, the grammar school in District 5. The other four
grade school districts are located in the suburbs and each has a boundary line-
contiguous to District 5. The southern boundary of District 5 runs along U.S.
Interstate Highway 80, and this highway is the northern boundary of Districts,
*EDrroR's NOTE: The following two comments are briefs argued in the 1965.
Moot Court Finals at the University of Missouri School of Law. The issue was the-
constitutionality of racial imbalance in the public schools. Since this is a timely
and important topic, the students were asked to expand their work and submit-
it to the Missouri Law Review for publication.
The setting of the case is Fenway, Jefferson, a mythical city and state of the-
United States.
The brief format has been retained in order that the authorities and argu-
ments on both sides may be fully presented.
(391)
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3 and 4. District 5 is bounded on the west by the tracks of the Columbus, Spring-
field & Denver Railroad.
Plaintiffs are six Negro children of grade school age who reside in District
5 and who now attend Washington Grammar School. Plaintiffs bring this action
against the School Board of Fenway on behalf of themselves and all others simi-
larly situated.
The parties have stipulated the following facts:
1. The school district boundary lines have been in their present location for
the past twenty-five years.1
1. Map of Fenway:
CITY OF FENWAY SCHOOL DISTRICTS





C.S. & D. HR.
-- --
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2. The present boundary lines were not initially located for the purpose of
segregating Negroes.
3. Prior to the decision in Brown v. Board of EduC.2 the Negro children liv-
ing in Districts 1, 2, 3 and 4 were required to attend school in District 5. At that
time there was also a high school for Negro students located in District 5 which
all Negro students attended.
4. After the decision in Brown v. Board of Educ., all Negro children have been
permitted to attend the grade school in the district where they reside. The Negro
high school has been closed (all students now attending the one city High School)
and the building has since been torn down and replaced with apartment houses.
5. At the time the boundaries of the school districts were established, the
population of each district was approximately 3,000. At the present time, the
population of District 5 has grown to about 4,500, the greatest influx of new resi-
dents being last year, while the population of the other districts has dropped to
about 2,800 each.
6. The Washington Grammar School in District 5 is 100 per cent Negro. The
grammar schools in the other districts are approximately 98 per cent white and 2
per cent Negro.
7. The School Board has announced that in order to accommodate the increase
in population in District 5, additional classrooms and other facilities will be built
onto Washington Grammar School, and the school district boundaries will remain
unchanged.
8. Prior to this suit, members of the Negro community had met repeatedly
with the School Board and had requested that the Board take action to reduce
the racial imbalance in the school system but the Board had declined to take
any action.
Plaintiffs brought this action in the Circuit Court asking for the following
relief:
A. A declaratory judgment that the School Board's refusal to alter the exist-
ing district boundaries violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. An injunction requiring the Fenway Board of Education to draw new
boundary lines so that all Negro children in District 5 will be absorbed in the
four contiguous white district schools.
C. As an alternative that the School Board be enjoined from adding onto
Washington Grammar School and ordered to draw new boundary lines so as to end
the present segregated situation.
D. As a second alternative that the court make such other order as will re-
quire the School Board to end the present segregated situation.
The trial court found that there was no discrimination in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and denied plaintiffs any relief.
Plaintiffs duly perfected their appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of
Jefferson.
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
1966]
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THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING NO DISCRIMINATION IN
VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND DENYING
PLAINTIFFS RELIEF BECAUSE:
I. THE STATE OF JEFFERSON IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTERING AND MAINTAINING
A COMPULSORY PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM IN WHICH NEARLY ALL NEGRO STUDENTS
ARE CONFINED TO A SCHOOL 100 PER CENT NEGRO AND ALL WHITE STUDENTS ARE
CONFINED TO SCHOOLS PREDOMINANTLY WHITE IN VIOLATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT.
Because the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are addressed to the
states, the issue in cases dealing with racially imbalanced schools is often said to
be whether there is "state action." But this phrase is little help because the Four-
teenth Amendment says nothing about "action" by a state. In fact, it is clear
that a state can violate the amendment by inaction. 3 On the other hand, there are
some situations where the state may have clearly "acted" and is responsible for
what has happened, but the ocurrence may not amount to a denial of rights. The
question is not whether or not a state has acted, but rather, under the circum-
stances has it denied equal protection; that is, because of the character of the state
involvement, or the relation of the state to the private acts in issue, has there
been a denial of rights for which the state should be held responsible?
Three factors, individually or collectively, will satisfy the constitutional re.
,quirements of government responsibility necessary to constitute a denial of rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment. First, the state operates and maintains a com-
pulsory system of public education. Second, the state reinforces and encourages
private discrimination by maintaining a racially imbalanced school system. Third,
the state is aware of the harm that results from racially imbalanced schools.
Failure to correct the harm amounts to sanctioning it.
A. The Government Operates and Maintains a Compulsory
System of Public Education
A traditional and essential function of local government is the maintenance
and operation of a public school system. Students are required by law to attend.
The government finances this system with public revenue, decides questions of
educational policy, and has the power to assign children to the various schools
in the system. The Supreme Court characterized this as "perhaps the most im-
portant function of state and local governments." 4 Some authors contend that
the mere legal compulsion to attend a school which is segregated in fact is suffi-
cient to bring that school within the rule of Brown.5 Such a finding would, of
course, require remedial action by the board.
3. In Lynch v. United States, 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1951), state police
officials allowed a mob to beat Negoes who the officers had arrested. In Catlette v.
United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943), an officer passively allowed a mob
to assault members of an unpopular religious sect.
4. Brown v. Board of Educ., supra note 2, at 493 (1954).
5. Wright, Public School Desegregation: Legal Remedies For De Facto
Segregation, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 285, 296 (1965).
[Vol. 31
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The school system in Fenway, as in most cities, operates on the "neighbor-
hood school plan." According to this plan, school district lines are drawn to en-
compass a small, contiguous "neighborhood," and children attend the school that
serves their particular neighborhood. Generally the district lines are drawn with
regard to location and capacity of various schools, population in the particular
area, and safety and convenience of children going to and from school. It may be
contended that since the neighborhood school plan is based solely on geographic
criteria and community convenience there is no ground for constitutional attack.
However, this is not the case.
Contrary to popular lay conception, no "right" exists to attend the school
nearest one's home or in the district in which one lives. No "right" can be found
in common law, the Constitution, or any statute. Likewise, the neighborhood
school plan, which is used in Fenway, is not a constitutional mandate. It is
nothing more than an educational policy, only one of several from which a school
board may choose in administering its system. Educational policies and standards
of placement are subordinate to constitutional rights.6
In 1940, the Fenway School Board was faced with a choice in determining
school attendance. It had many options available to it, but it chose to use geo-
graphic criteria. The effects of that choice have resulted in the racial imbalance
existing in Fenway today.
It is not contended that the present district lines were initially located for the
purpose of segregating Negroes. Nor is it contended that the school board is re-
sponsible for the residential pattern that has resulted in the Negro ghetto in
the center of Fenway. Instead, it appears more and more that such racially con-
centrated residential patterns are the result of social complexities that seem to
crystallize in private discrimination in the areas of employment and housing.7 The
point is that the Negro does not have the same ability to choose his residence as
the school board has to choose its attendance plan.
The pattern of population, as well as geography and safety, is one of several
considerations before the Board when it chooses a method to determine school
attendance. In fact, the Board is required to consider this factor. In Dowell v.
School Bd. of Educ.,s Negroes lived in easily definable areas similar to those in
6. Dove v. Parham, 282 F.2d 256, 258 (8th Cir. 1960).
7. In Dowell v. Bd. of Educ., 244 F. Supp. 971 (W.D. Okla. 1965), the
court took judicial notice of the continuing subordinate position Negroes hold on
the economic ladder; and that there was resistance in all white communities to
Negroes who sought to obtain housing there. The point was also recognized in
Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal.2d 876, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606, 382 P.2d
878 (1963), although in that case the court went on to find that the imbalance
was intensified by the purposeful and unreasonable action on the part of the
board. Judge Skelly Wright of the United States Court of Appeals of the District
of Columbia has concluded, "more and more it is becoming apparent that perhaps
the primary cause of de facto segregation in urban schools is the socio-economic
condition of the Negro. The inability of many Negroes, because of overt and covertjob discrimination, to find proper employment drives them and their families into
the segregated slums which disgrace many of our metropolitan areas." Wright,
sv4pra note 5, at 290.
8. Supra note 7.
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Fenway. The court found that drawing school zone lines without regard to resi-
dential patterns would improperly continue segregation, and condemned the
practice. While the Fenway Board may not have been racially motivated, it must
have been aware that a racially imbalanced school would result from the way it
drew the district lines. Although the board could have used an entirely different
method of determining school attendance, it deliberately chose the one method
which could only result in the present racial imbalance-geography.
If, in determining the district lines, the Board considers the economic and
social restraints on the Negro, this is tantamount to active gerrymandering, held
illegal in Clemons v. Board of Pub. Educ.9 It will surely be argued that nothing
points to gerrymandered districts in Fenway, and that the districts are in no way
irregular but are rather based on reasonable geographic factors. However, the
establishment of school zones with the knowledge that a racially imbalanced
school will result is no more defensible than considering racial patterns for the
purpose of attaining the same goal. As was suggested in a recent article,
Traditional gerrymandering consists of abnormally shaped zones, but the
concept could be extended to cover a community where the school board's
policy toward the imbalance is one of approval and, although existing
attendance zones are geographically justified, other zoning plans that
would not result in imbalanced schools are equally acceptable in geo-
graphic terms.' 0
While a school board generally has a great deal of discretion in drawing
school district lines, its judgment must rest on legal and valid grounds. Further-
more, merely because an attendance zone appears to be compact is not necessarily
the controlling factor. In addition to compactness, the Board must consider resi-
dential patterns, local customs and practices which limit the area in which Negroes
live, and other factors that would affect the result."
One such factor is the past practice of a Board which may affect the present
situation. It was stipulated that prior to 1954 all Negro children living in Fen-
way were required by law to attend school in District 5. There was, then, a bi-
racial school system in Fenway, and the effects of that system are still felt today.
Where cessation of past segregation policies is insufficient to bring about more than
token change in a public school system, the school board must take affirmative
action reasonably designed to effectuate the desegregation goal.' 2 The past prac-
tice of segregation, combined with the present attitude of the board, results in
the same racial imbalance in the schools and the consequent harm to children
that was prohibited in Brown.'3
9. 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1956).
10. Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: Thre Constitutional Con-
cepts, 78 HARv. L. REv. 564, 599 (1965).
11. Dowell v. Board of Educ., supra note 7, at 980.
12. Id. at 978-79.
13. Supra note 10, at 602.
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B. By Maintaining a Racially Imbalanced School System the State Reinforces and
Encourages Private Discrimination
The actions of private persons in certain circumstances, when sanctioned or
reinforced by an arm of the state, amount to state or governmental responsibility.
Thus, political parties in Smith v. Ailwrighlt 14 and Rice v. Ellmore,15 proprietors of
a company-owned town in Mars. v. Alabama,'6 and lessees of governmental
property in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority17 have been deemed to be
acting as the state in certain situations.
In Shelley v. Kraemer's the Supreme Court struck down judicial enforcement
of racial restrictive covenants in housing as constituting state action forbidden
by the Fourteenth Amendment. The case thus stands for the proposition that the
state may not give discriminatory acts of private persons the force of law. Does
not the local school board violate that proposition when it operates essentially
segregated schools? By reinforcing acts of private discrimination, the board assures
private persons that if they are able to keep their neighborhoods segregated
their schools will be segregated also.
The school board certainly must have been aware of the fact that its choice
of geographic factors to determine school attendance would also influence the
residential pattern. The nature of the public school often plays an essential role
in a family's choice of a neighborhood. Just as the residential pattern affects
the racial composition of the school, the racial composition of the school affects
the residential pattern. By adhering to geographic criteria, the board assures the
parent who does not want his children to go to school with Negroes that he can
accomplish his goal by moving into a white neighborhood. If it were within the
power of those protesting the imbalanced school to eliminate the residential
pattern, responsibility might be shifted away from the government. However, as
pointed out, economic disabilities, the anticipation of a hostile reception in a
white neighborhood, and racial discrimination in housing deprive most Negroes
of any choice to move out of the ghetto.' 9 The school board has no such restric-
tions on it when it makes its choice. The result is that the board has sanctioned
private discrimination that has resulted in a ghettoized residential pattern and has
reinforced this through its rigid use of geographic criteria.
The effect on the children was pointed out in the appendix to appellants'
brief in Brown:
The child who ... is compelled to attend a segregated school may be able
to cope with ordinary expressions of prejudice by regarding the prejudiced
person as evil or misguided; but he cannot readily cope with symbols of
authority, the full force of the authority of the state-the school or the
school board, in this instance-in the same manner. Given both the ordi-
14. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
15. 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947).
16. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
17. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
18. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
19. Supra note 7.
19661
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nary expression of prejudice and the school's policy of segregation, the
former takes on greater force and seemingly becomes an expression of the
latter. 20
By recognizing and sanctioning the private discrimination that perpetuates
racially concentrated residential patterns, the board thereby enhances awareness
of the social differences and feelings of inferiority that the Supreme Court in
Brown found to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
If the School Board of Fenway were to draw up this same attendance plan
today and present it to the Supreme Court, would the Court allow it merely be-
cause the word "Negro" is not mentioned, the plan being cast only in terms of
residence? Clearly the state could not pass a law that would create the present
situation in Fenway. But by strictly following these same geographic criteria in
the face of the severe racial imbalance in Fenway, the Board is sanctioning, ap-
proving and encouraging the very factors that have brought about the imbalance.
Such inflexible adherence to the neighborhood school policy has been held to
unlawfully maintain and extend school segregation. 2'
C. The State Has Failed to Correct the Harm Caused by the Racial Imbalance.
This Inaction by the State Amounts to Sanctioning the Harm
in Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
The effect of adherence to geographic criteria on residential patterns has al-
ready been pointed out. There is yet another reason for holding the school board
responsible. The state has drawn the district lines and it is within the power of the
state alone to change them. The state is aware of the imbalance and the resulting
harm. Therefore, any failure to remedy the forbidden harm due to inaction only
causes further harm. Members of the Negro community in Fenway have met re-
peatedly with the school board to request that action be taken to reduce the racial
imbalance. The board's only response has been an announcement of plans to
build a new addition to the Washington School, which will only assure continued
racial imbalance in the system. Such persistent refusal to alleviate the situation
can only amount to a sanctioning of the district lines as they presently exist.
Catlette v. United States22 upheld the conviction of an officer who passively
allowed a mob to assault a group of Jehovah's Witnesses. Lynch v. United States28
condemned state police officials who allowed a mob to seize and beat Negroes the
police had arrested. Similarly, "inaction" on the part of school officials may also
amount to a denial of constitutional rights. Gerrymandering of district lines, al-
lowing transfer privileges for whites only, or the strategic building of schools in
such a way as to insure continued segregation are devious tactics designed to per-
mit the school board to continue a policy of active segregation. Where it is clear
that the neighborhood school plan is used as a subterfuge to allow the use of such
20. The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of Desegregation: A
Social Science Statement, 37 MINN. L. Ray. 427, 433 (1953).
21. Dowell v. Board of Educ., supra note 7, at 977.
22. Supra note 3.
23. Supra note 3.
[Vol. 31
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tactics, there is no doubt that such an "active" policy would constitute state ac-
tion.
But the Fenway School Board need take no action at all to insure continued
racial segregation. Taylor v. Board of EduC. 24 held that inaction that results in
segregation is just as culpable as an active policy that is followed for the same
purpose. In that case the New Rochelle School Board had created the Lincoln
School as a racially segregated school. It maintained the school as such by gerry-
mandering the district it served from time to time. Gerrymandering ceased in
1934 and since that time the attendance area lines had not been changed. Until
1949 the board followed a transfer policy which allowed white students to transfer
out of the district in question, while refusing transfers to Negroes. In that year
the board instituted the neighborhood school plan, which assigned students on
the basis of their residence. The result of this new policy was that 94 per cent of
the children attending the Lincoln School were Negroes. As the appellate court
stated, the result was a "freezing in of segregation." 25
The plaintiffs sued on the basis that this was segregation which resulted from
intentional acts on the part of the school authorities. They sought to enjoin the
board from enrolling them in Lincoln School, to require the board to register them
in a racially integrated school and to enjoin the building of a new school on the
site. The district court granted relief on the basis that the board had not acted
in good faith to implement desegregation and that its conduct since 1949 had
been motivated by the desire to maintain the school as racially segregated.
The significant aspect of Taylor to the present case is that the school board
had dropped its policy of active segregation through the gerrymandering process
eleven years before the action was commenced. Furthermore, the consensus of
the testimony of expert witnesses appeared to be that racial conditions in the
Lincoln School district at the time of the suit were no longer a result of
the manner in which the school board had previously mapped the district,
but a result of the voluntary influx of Negroes into the general neighbor-
hood.26 Thus, the school board had long abandoned active discrimination, and the
population of the originally gerrymandered school district had remained largely
Negro. This resulted not because the board had altered the district boundaries
to encompass most or all of any new Negro arrivals, nor for any reason involving
action by the board. Rather, the resulting ghetto occurred because old Negro in-
habitants of the district remained within its boundaries, and new Negroes settled
within them. Since the board had been "inactive" in promoting a policy of segre-
gation for eleven years, the racial imbalance was therefore not the result of official
policy or activity. It was, however, just as "sanctioned by law" and just as in-
fected with segregation as if it were based on racial factors.
Further parallels between Taylor and the case at bar help to illustrate the
point. Both boards used geographic criteria. Both created and maintained a state
imposed bi-racial school system for a time, and then continued to maintain the
24. 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
25. Taylor v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 1961).
26. Id. at 43 (dissenting opinion).
19661
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same district lines. Both imposed a "no-transfer" policy on the neighborhood school
plan. Both sanctioned an attendance plan which continued to keep one or more
schools segregated. And both allowed segregation to continue through their "in-
action." Thus, for the Fenway School Board to say it is not responsible for the
segregation because it has ceased its wrongdoing is not to say it has absolved it-
self of the results. These are two vastly different things. The present effects of past
segregation policies will disappear only when the board has taken steps on its own
to eliminate them.
Branche v. Board of Educ.2 differs somewhat on its facts from Taylor, but is
a logical extension of its reasoning. The case came before the court on a motion
to dismiss plaintiffs' petition which alleged "maintenance of racially segregated
public grade schools" 28 in Hempstead, Long Island. The defendant school board
had not gerrymandered school zones for the purpose of segregation when it plotted
them in 1949. Instead, it had adopted a resolution requiring school children to
attend the school in the zone of their residence. Plaintiffs, Negro school children,
were residents of districts whose Negro populations had increased since 1949 so
that the increases, in conjunction with the board's 1949 resolution, resulted in
the schools being predominantly Negro. The school district contained eight schools
in six zones. The percentages of Negro students in the respective zones were 86, 78,
67, 33, 5, and 1. The total Negro population in the whole district was 47 per cent.
At the time of the suit the board was planning to enlarge the heavily Negro
populated second and third zones. The board answered plaintiffs' prayer for an
injunction with affidavits setting out the above facts, argued that the facts demon-
strated no discrimination on its part, and moved for a summary judgment. The
court denied defendant board's motion for two reasons. First, it seemed to feel
that the board might have been racially motivated as in Taylor. More important,
however, the court found that the board had failed in its duty to correct the
situation for which it was in large part responsible. The court flatly stated, "failure
to deal with a condition as really inflicts it as does any grosser imposition of it."20
The court saw no difference between an active segregation policy and the failure
to correct a segregated situation.
The case of Blocker v. Board of .EduC.30 further supports the argument that
school boards may not put the sole responsibility for segregated schools on resi-
dential patterns if they reinforce such patterns by their own action or "culpable
inaction." This suit was a class action to declare the public schools of Manhasset,
Long Island, racially segregated. The district in question included three elementary
schools. Of a total of 1340 students, 600 were served by one school with a three-
square mile area; 574 by another school with a two-square mile area; and 166 by
the school in question with a one-half square mile area. The first two of these
schools were entirely white and the third 99.2 per cent Negro. The attendance
lines had been drawn in 1929 and had not been changed at the time of the suit.
27. 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
28. Ibid.
29. Supra note 27, at 153.
30. 226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
(Vol. 31
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Evidence showed that the teachers had been greatly concerned about the situation
in the district and had communicated their concern to the school board. There
was no proof that the original drawing of the zone lines had been motivated by
racial considerations, but the court felt that a failure to revise the attendance lines
when there was no justification for not doing so was tantamount to racial motiva-
tion.
The court made no sweeping pronouncement that integration was required in
all cases. But it did state in unequivocal terms that there was a constitutional duty
not only to cease educational policies that resulted in the segregated schools, but
to correct the imbalance as well. The court reasoned that the school board was,
and for several years had been, aware of the total separation of the entire Negro
population from over 99 per cent of their white contemporaries. If the board were
to set up the same attendance plan today it would be regarded as a device to
separate the races. Since the board had knowledge of the separation, the court
reasoned that the continuation of the present attendance plan could no more be
insulated from the Fourteenth Amendment than if it were drawn up and presented
as a new plan.3l
Further discussing government responsibility, the court left no doubt that the
state was not only responsible for the imbalance, but was under a duty to correct
it. In ordering the school board to end the racial imbalance, the district court held
the separation of the Negro elementary school children is segregation. It
is segregation by law-the law of the School Board. In the light of the
existing facts, the continuance of the defendant Board's impenetrable at-
tendance lines amounts to nothing less than state imposed segregation....
In a publicly supported, mandatory state educational system, the
plaintiffs have the civil right not to be segregated, not to be compelled to
attend a school in which all of the Negro children are educated separate
and apart from over 99% of their white contemporaries. That they are
being so compelled is a fact.3 2
Since the school board fixed attendance lines, the court argued that the board
must determine when, if ever, these policies should be modified. By failing to
change the attendance lines the defendant board had transgressed the prohibi-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment.33
Surely the Fenway board is as guilty of this transgression as was the board
in Blocker. Both had a past history of segregation and both permitted it to
continue through "inaction." Similarly, in Dowelt34 the court rejected the board's
position that it had no affirmative duty to adopt remedial policies. Failure to adopt
a policy was a policy in itself.2 5 The court went on to find a duty to disestablrtr
segregation in public schools where segregation policies were in force and their
31. Id. at 225-26.
32. Id. at 226-27.
33. Id. at 227.
34. Dowell v. Board of Educ., supra note 7.
35. Id. at 975.
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effects had not been corrected.8 6 The failure of the state to correct the imbalance
is tantamount to state imposed segregation. Neither can be condoned.
II. THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THE STATE TO PROVIDE EQUAL EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITIES IN ITS PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM: IT Is THE HARM CAUSED BY
RACIAL IMBALANCE, Nor THE RACIAL IMBALANCE ITSELF, THAT Is PROHIBITED.
IT MAKES No DIFFERENCE How THE IMBALANCE COMES ABOUT.
The underlying theory in most protests against segregated and racially im-
balanced schools is that the educational opportunity afforded Negro children is
unequal to that afforded children attending the other public schools of the com-
munity. This theory rests on the principle that the equal protection clause re-
quires equality of educational opportunity. Although this principle is derived pri-
marily from recent cases, it is also consistent with earlier interpretations of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In earlier cases the Supreme Court often looked to the spirit and over-all pur-
pose of the amendment when read together with its two sister Civil War Amend-
ments-the Thirteenth and Fifteenth. Broad language in these cases indicates that
the guarantee of equal protection is that a person shall not be denied a benefit
because of his race as a result of state action. This principle is discussed thorough-
ly in The Slaughterhouse Cases8 7 and in Strauder v. West Virginia,38 where Mr.
Justice Strong said of the Fourteenth Amendment:
The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain
a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right, most valuable to
the colored race,--the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation
against them distinctively as colored,--exemption from legal discrimina-
tions, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their
enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which
are steps towards reducing them to the conditions of a subject race.89
It has been argued that the case of Plessy v. Ferguson,40 which laid down the
"separate but equal" doctrine, was a withdrawal from this principle. This is not
true, however, for the Court in Plessy undertook to show that segregation did not
really disadvantage the Negro except through his own choice.41
More recent interpretations by the Supreme Court clarify the principle. In
Sweatt v. Painter42 the state of Texas offered to match the educational oppor-
tunity it afforded white law students by building a law school for Negroes. The
attempted segregation failed when the Negro plaintiff's admission to the white
University of Texas Law School was compelled. The Court decided that the edu-
36. Id. at 981.
37. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
38. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
39. Id. at 307-08.
40. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
41. Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE LJ. 420,
421 (1960).
42. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
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cational opportunity offered the Negro was unequal. There was no "substantial
equality in the educational opportunities offered white and Negro law students by
the State."43 In measuring the quality of the educational opportunity the Court
did not stop at such measurable factors as the number of faculty members, variety
of courses, opportunities for specialization, size of student body, size of the li-
brary, and availability of law review and other activities. What was more im-
portant, Chief Justice Vinson found, was that the white University of Texas
Law School possessed "to a far greater degree those qualities which are incapable
of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school." 44
The equal educational opportunity principle was reinforced by a unanimous
court in McLatrin v. Oklahoma State Regents,45 where a Negro graduate student
was admitted to an otherwise all white school, but was separated from the whites
in the classroom, library, and cafeteria. The Court condemned these restrictions
on the ground that they rendered his educational opportunity inferior. The Court
found that "such restrictions impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in
discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his
trade."48
Finally, in Brown v. Board of Educ V the Court laid down the basic principle:
the educational opportunity afforded in the public schools must be made available
to all on equal terms. The Court first addressed itself to the question presented:
"Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race ...de-
prive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities?" 48
The Court assumed that the physical facilities and other tangible factors were
equal, and went on, through a series of logical steps, to establish the relationship
between segregation and the impairment of educational opportunity that was
found repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment. First, a Negro public school
does not possess those qualities, enumerated in Sweatt, that are "incapable of ob-
jective measurement ' 49 but critical in determining the quality of the educational
opportunity. Second, the Negro child compelled to go to a Negro school is de-
prived, even more than in McLaurin, of the educationally important opportunity
to engage in discussion and exchange views with white students.50 Third, to
separate Negro school children from their peers, solely because of their race,
"generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." 51 This would
have an "effect on their educational opportunities" 52 since a "sense of inferiority
43. Id. at 633.
44. Id. at 634.
45. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
46. Id. at 641.
47. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
48. Id. at 493.
49. Ibid.
50. Id. at 493-94.
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affects the motivation of the child to learn."15 The Court then concluded: "Separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal." 54 (Emphasis added.)
It should be noted that Brown was a case in which the state required segrega-
tion. However, the Court decided the case on the equal educational opportunity
principle. Thus, the Court was far more concerned with the effect on the children
as a result of segregation rather than the cause of the segregation. It is often
pointed out that the Court could have reached the same result in Brown on dif-
ferent grounds, declaring the segregation unconstitutional under the broad lan-
guage of Strauder and earlier interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5
The Court could have struck down the segregation on the grounds that it con-
stituted an unreasonable, arbitrary classification offensive to the due process
clause.56 The significant point, however, is not how the Court could have decided
the case, but how it did decide the case. It decided on the basis of the equal edu-
cational opportunity principle, thus elevating that principle to constitutional status.
III. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RESuRES THE STATE TO CORRECT THE IM-
BALANCE.
A. The Ride of Brown v. Board of Educ. Requires Affirnative Action by the State
Once a denial of equal protection is established to bring the case within the
rule of Brown then affirmative action to remedy the imbalance is called for.
Recognition of the inequality resulting from racially imbalanced schools has led to
a growing body of state law that racial imbalance in public schools is in and of
itself harmful and illegal, and that a segregated school is inherently unequal
whatever the reasons underlying the segregation. Massachusetts has gone so far
as to pass a statute on the subject. The act declares that racial imbalance shall
be deemed to exist when the percentage of non-white students in any public school
is in excess of fifty per cent of the total number of students in such school.57 The
act goes on to provide for witholding state funds from any district that fails to
take action to remedy the imbalance.55
In addition, there are a number of state reports showing a trend toward elimi-
nation of racial imbalance. The most important of these is Mitchell v. Board of
Educ.,59 where the New York State Commissioner announced that the racial im-
53. Ibid.
54. Id. at 495.
55. See textual discussion of Slaughterhouse and Strander at notes 37 and 38,
.'upra.
56. In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), decided the same day as Brown,
the Court used the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to prohibit segre-
gated schools in the District of Columbia.
57. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37D (1965).
58. MAss. GEN. 'LAWS ch. 15, § 11 (1965).
59. 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 735 (1963). In addition, see Memorandum by New
York State Commissioner of Education, 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 738 (1963); Fischer
v. Board of Educ., 8 RAcE REL. L. REP. 730 (1963); Jackson v. Pasadena City
School Dist., 59 Cal.2d 876, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606, 382 P.2d 878 (1963); Racial Im-
balance in the Public Schools-Legislative Motive and the Constitution, 50 VA. L.
REv. 464, 502-529 (1964).
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balance existing in a school with wholly or predominantly Negro enrollment "in-
terferes with the achievement of educational opportunity." He went on to observe
that
modem psychological and sociological knowledge seems to indicate that
in schools in which the enrollment is largely from a minority group of
homogenous ethnic origin, the personality of these minority group chil-
dren may be damaged. There is a decrease in motivation and thus an
impairment of ability to learn. Public education in such a situation is so-
cially unrealistic.60
The Commissioner reiterated the underlying rationale of Brown: it is the harm
that results from attending a school composed predominantly of children of the
same racial origin that violates the Constitution. Whether the separation of
Negroes is required by statute, fostered by manipulations of district lines and
school attendance plans, or permitted to continue through the inaction of the
local school board, the resulting harm to the Negro school children is the same.
It makes no difference how the separation comes about. As was pointed out by
the Blocker court, elementary school children "are not so mature and sophisticated
as to distinguish between the total separation of all Negroes pursuant to a man-
datory or permissive state statute"6 ' and separation which arises from residential
factors.
The Branclke court, too, found the Constitution to forbid not only the denial
of equal protection when it was violated by positive law, but also when that same
denial is brought about through culpable inaction or lax school board administra-
tion. The court recognized that segregated education is inadequate.62 It supported
the rationale of Brown and recognized that "the central constitutional fact is the
inadequacy of segregated education." 63 It then demanded some remedial action
from the educational system which must deal with the inadequacy arising from
adventitious segregation: "it cannot accept and indurate segregation on the
ground that it is not coerced or planned, but accepted." 64
So here it is not enough to show that residence accounts for the fact of
segregation and to contend that therefore the segregation is ineluctable.
The effort to mitigate the consequent educational inadequacy has not been
made and to forego that effort to deal with the inadequacy is to im-
pose it in the absence of a conclusive demonstration that no circum-
stantially possible effort can effect any significant mitigation. What is in-
volved here is not convenience [of the school board] but constitutional
interests.6 5
The reports of psychologists and sociologists confirming the harmful effect
on Negro children are too numerous to mention. In addition, there is no evidence
whatsoever to indicate that the intensity of this harm is lessened because the
60. Mitchell v. Board of Educ., supra note 59, at 737.
61. Supra note 30, at 229.
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segregation is not required by positive law or policy. The court in In re Skipwith Oo
recognized this by way of dictum, observing that the defects of segregated educa-
tion are inherent and incurable no matter what the cause of the segregation.07
It then went on to find that the record supported the contention that the separa-
tion of children by race, "whether it be the result of governmental action or of
private housing segregation, creates factors inimical to the full and equal educa-
tional opportunities."6 8 A school child is not capable of distinguishing between
state imposed segregation on the one hand, and "non-state imposed segregation"
on the other.69
Education is not only one of the most crucial factors in determining the
course of every individual's life, but it has a most profound effect on determining
the very character of our society. The injurious effect that segregated schools have
in retarding education is an essential factor in society. This was stated by the
dissent in Carr v. Corning in language equally applicable to compulsory or actual
segregation: "Instead of serving the public purpose it [segregation] fosters prej-
udice and obstructs the education of whites and Negroes by endorsing prejudice
and preventing mutual acquaintance." 70
This recognition of the importance of contact and interaction between chil-
dren of different cultural and racial backgrounds was also supported by the New
York Commissioner's Advisory Committee on Human Relations and Community
Tensions. Its report stated: "The presence in a single school of children from
varied racial, cultural, socio-economic and religious backgrounds is an important
element in the preparation of young people for active participation in the social
and political affairs of our democracy. ' 71 The Committee felt that racially im-
balanced schools are socially unrealistic and wasteful of manpower and talent,
whether they occur by law or fact.
Failure to provide equal educational opportunities is inexcusable when there
are reasonable means to do so. Brown aimed at correcting the harm suffered by
Negro children in segregated learning conditions. Such conditions still exist due to a
dubious distinction as to how the segregation arises. To permit continued segrega-
tion on the basis of such a questionable distinction is intolerable.
B. The Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
Require Affirmative Action by the State
The school board may argue that its method of determining school attendance
is rationally related to the purpose of education and the courts must therefore
ignore the resulting segregation. But when attempting to justify racial classifica-
tions, the state bears a heavier burden than merely showing it is rationally re-
lated to its goal. As stated in McLaughlin v. Florida,72 state action resulting in
66. 14 Misc.2d 325, 338, 180 N.Y.S.2d 852, 866 (1958).
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. For discussion see Drinan, Racially Balanced Schools: Psychological and
Legal Effects, 11 CATHOLiC LAW. 16 (1965).
70. 182 F.2d 14, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
71. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN BLACK AND WHITE 298 (1964).
72. 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
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racial segregation will be upheld "only if it is necessary, and not merely rationally
related to, the accomplishment of a permissible state policy."73 Any Board argu-
ment to the effect that some necessity exists to justify racial segregation is nulli-
fied by the Supreme Court's statement that "Segregation in public education is
not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective .... ."74 (Emphasis
added.)
Thus, an intent to segregate may be inferred unless officials can show not that
their action is reasonably related to a proper governmental purpose, but that
there is no reasonable way to accomplish that purpose without segregation. Profes-
sor Sedler refers to this as the "reasonable alternative" doctrine.7 5 Where a state
can accomplish its object [education] without interfering with a recognized right
[right to an equal educational opportunity], but chooses a method which, while
accomplishing the object, also interferes with the right, its failure to choose the
reasonable alternative violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The principle has been
applied most frequently in the areas of economic regulation and freedom of
speech.76
73. Id. at 196.
74. Bolling v. Sharpe, supra note 56, at 499-500.
75. Sedler, School Segregation in the North and West, 7 ST. Louis U.L.J. 228
(1963).
76. In Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926), the state uninten-
tionally prohibited the sale of certain goods when it could have accomplished the
desired result by regulation. The Court held that failure to adopt the reasonable
alternative constituted excessive regulation. The same principle was applied in
Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S.504 (1924). There the state passed a statute
for the purpose of preventing short weights in the sale of bread. Because of baking
practices, the measure had the undesired side-effect of prohibiting the sale of un-
wrapped bread. The Court found that the state could have achieved its object
through other equally effective methods which would not have had the effect of
prohibiting the sale of unwrapped bread, and declared the measure unconstitutional.
The principle was also applied in W. B. Worthern Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S.
426 (1934), where the Court struck down a statute exempting proceeds of life in-
surance policies from execution. While the statute accomplished the legitimate
governmental purpose of protecting needy debtors, it also had the effect of destroy-
ing the rights of all past judgment creditors. Since the state could have achieved
its goal without the undesirable side-effect, the state's failure to employ a reasona-
ble alternative was found to violate the rights of the creditors.
Admittedly, these cases are in the area of economic regulation and the courts
have more recently deferred to legislative discretion in that area. Nevertheless, it
is still the task of the courts to decide whether the means chosen to achieve the
governmental goal are constitutional and properly related to that goal. Staten
Island Loaders v. Waterfront Comm'n, 117 F. Supp. 308, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
The doctrine has also been appplied in the area of free expression. In Schneider
v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 164-65 (1939), the ordinance in question, which
the city contended was necessary to prevent littering in the streets and fraudulent
appeals to householders, was applied to a person distributing religious literature.
The Court invalidated the ordinance on the ground that the city could find other
ways to prevent such harm without destroying the opportunity to disseminate
religious literature. In response to the city's claim that alternative methods of
accomplishing its purpose were not as efficient or convenient, the Court answered
that "considerations of this sort do not empower a municipality to abridge freedom
of speech and press." Similarly, in Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960), the
1966]
17
Greenberg: Greenberg: Albertson v. School Board- Yes
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
The principle is equally applicable in the area of school segregation. In the
Branche case the court denied defendant board's motion for a summary judgment,
even though there was no evidence that the board maintained an active policy of
segregation. It recognized that the requisite state action was present in the opera-
tion of the school system. More important, it found that the state was causing
great harm when it required children to attend school on a segregated basis due
to the fact that the neighborhood where they lived was segregated. The main
thrust of the opinion was that the state could not ignore the harm caused by
actual segregation if there was something it could do about it. The court stated:
The educational system that is thus compulsory and publicly afforded
must deal with the inadequacy arising from adventitious segregation; it
cannot accept and indurate segregation on the ground that it is not coerced
or planned but accepted.7
The language of the court is very similar to that of the "reasonable alterna-
tive" cases. The case is significant in that (1) it recognizes that the state is in
effect causing psychological harm and denying equal educational opportunities
when schools are factually segregated, despite the absence of a policy of segrega-
tion; and (2) the state must make an effort to mitigate the harmful consequences
of segregation if this can be done practicably.
The method adopted by the Fenway School Board, the neighborhood school
plan, is only one of several rational ways to determine school attendance. At the
time the district boundary lines were drawn the population of each district was
approximately 3000; thus the school in each district was capable of handling
about the same number of children. Since that time, however, the population of
District 5 has grown to 4500 while the population of the other four districts has
decreased to only 2800. This has resulted in overcrowding of the Washington
School in District 5 and consequent availability of space in the other districts. The
board could easily install an "open transfer plan," whereby any Negro student
could choose to transfer to one of the underpopulated schools.78 This could be
done without any inconvenience or disruption of the educational system because
of the small size of Fenway. The Negro children living on the fringe area of
District 5 could walk to the closest white school in many cases, particularly to
the school in District 2 (see map of Fenway supra note 1). Short bus rides would
accommodate any Negro child living in the center of District 5 who wished to
transfer. This would not only reduce the harm caused by racial imbalance, but
Court laid down the rule that the state must bear the burden of showing it could
not accomplish its objective by a regulation rather than a prohibition.
In another situation the Court indicated that at least one basis for its decision
was that the state could have accomplished its purpose without destroying the
rights of persons. In Barnette v. Board of Educ., 319 U.S. 624 (1943), the Court
observed that the school board could have taught patriotism by requiring courses
in American history rather than by requiring children to salute the flag against
their religious beliefs.
77. Branche v. Board of Educ., supra note 27, at 153.
78. For favorable comment see authorities discussed in Auster, De Facto
Segregation, 6 Wm. & M.L. Rnv. 41, 56 (1965).
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would also mitigate the overcrowded condition in the Washington School without
inconvenience to the school authorities.
By adopting the open transfer plan the Board could prevent feelings of
racial inferiority.70 To maintain the present method and build an addition to
Washington School would only assure continued racial imbalance. The result is
that the Board would not give each child an equal educational opportunity. Both
methods enable the state to educate the children. But since the state could ac-
complish its object without causing feelings of inferiority, and without interfering
with the operation of the school system, its failure to choose the reasonable alterna-
tive offends the Fourteenth Amendment.
The same holds true with other techniques for determining school attendance,
such as redrawing the district lines so as to cut through the Negro ghetto rather
than surrounding it; adoption of the "Princeton Plan";80 strategic site selections
for new schools on the fringe areas of the ghetto; enlargement of the attendance
zone(s); or any combination of remedies. If one choice would prevent actual segre-
gation and its resulting harm, and at the same time not interfere with the opera-
tion of the school system, there is no reason why the board should not adopt that
choice. Its failure to choose the reasonable alternative is unjustifiable since the
harm could be easily eliminated. In other words, the reasonableness of the board's
action must be considered in the light of the harm actual segregation does to
Negro students.
In theory the neighborhood school plan is perfectly sound. However, the very
term "neighborhood school" implies that the school is capable of competently
serving the neighborhood in which it is located. If that school is not adequate
to perform the prime function of a school-if it is not capable of giving the people
it serves an equal educational opportunity-then it is merely playing with words
to call it a neighborhood school. If the school is not capable of offering its stu-
dents an equal educational opportunity, it then becomes the function of the school
board to take whatever steps are necessary so that the school can adequately per-
form its function.
Respondent board may contend that if they adopt the open transfer plan, they
will have to let any white children that wish to transfer do so also, resulting in
the disruption of the educational system. But this argument overlooks realities.
First of all, it is unlikely that white children would want to transfer. More im-
portant, however, it is perfectly justifiable to permit only Negoes to transfer. It
is well settled that a state does not deny equal protection by giving a benefit to a
group that needs it while denying the same benefit to a group that does not.81
79. It might be argued that many Negroes won't want to transfer, and there-
fore won't get an equal education. The answer is that while it may be desirable
that each child receive an equal education it is not required. The Constitution re-
quires only that each child be given an equal educational opportunity.
80. According to this plan, two schools are paired and serve the same area.
One school is used for grades 1-4 and the other for grades 5-8.
81. Justice Frankfurter observed, "The Constitution does not require things
which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as if they were the
same." Tiguer v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940) (dissenting opinion).
19
Greenberg: Greenberg: Albertson v. School Board- Yes
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1966
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
The basis for the holding in Brown was that the Negro students suffered feelings of
inferiority as a result of segregation. It therefore follows that he needs to be relieved
of the consequences incident to the segregated learning situation. There is no evi-
dence that white children suffer any feelings of inferiority due to their race. Con-
sequently, they have no need to transfer.
The board might object that it cannot use race at all in determining school
attendance because the "Constitution is color blind."8 2 Thus, it is argued, no recog-
nition to race may be given at all.83 However, it is hard to take this argument
seriously. First, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were de-
signed to protect Negroes. Second, nothing in Brown prohibits recognizing race to
relieve an inequality. Finally, courts have clearly recognized that the Negro
minority may have entirely different needs than the white majority.8 4 Both the
Taylors 5 and DoweU8 6 courts rejected the claim that school boards may not con-
sider race in alleviating a segregated school system.
In conclusion it must be remembered that the state is acting by operating a
public school system and requiring attendance. In such operation it is subject to
the requirements of equal protection and due process and cannot effectively main-
tain segregation merely because private arrangements have resulted in segregated
neighborhoods.
STANLEY I. GREENBERG
82. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (dissenting opinion).
83. This argument was specifically rejected in Springfield School Comm'n
v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261, 266 (1965).
84. In Sweatt v. Painter, supra note 42, the Court emphasized that most of
the lawyers and judges in the state were white, justifying the Negro's need for
contact with white lawyers. The Court thus recognized differences in needs as a
result of discrimination. In Meredith v. Fair, 298 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1962), the
court considered a requirement of the University of Mississippi that each candi-
date for admission furnish certificates from alumni that he was of good moral char-
acter. The court recognized differences in need in holding that the requirement
denied equal protection to Negro students, as they would find great difficulty in
obtaining such certificates due to their race.
85. Supra note 25, at 50-51.
86. Sumra note 7, at 981.
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